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FORMAL INDICATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND
THEOLOGY: BONHOEFFER’S CRITIQUE
OF HEIDEGGER
Brian Gregor

This paper examines Heidegger’s account of the proper relation between
philosophy and theology, and Dietrich Bonhoeﬀer’s critique thereof. Part
I outlines Heidegger’s proposal for this relationship in his lecture “Phenomenology and Theology,” where he suggests that philosophy might aid
theology by means of ‘formal indication.’ In that context Heidegger never
articulates what formal indication is, so Part II exposits this obscure notion
by looking at its treatment in Heidegger’s early lecture courses, as well as its
roots in Husserl. Part III presents Bonhoeﬀer’s theological response, which
challenges Heidegger’s attempt to maintain a neutral ontology that remains
unaﬀected by both sin and faith.

If we take his word for it, Heidegger’s notion of formal indication (formale
Anzeige) is good news for theology. The recent translation of Heidegger’s
lecture course “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” in volume 60 of the Gesamtausgabe, provides valuable resources for understanding what formal indication is, and extends an invitation to consider further Heidegger’s delineation of the often ambiguous boundaries between
philosophical thinking, religious faith, and theological inquiry. In the present paper I look at a number of Heidegger’s lecture courses from the 1920s,
as well as his programmatic statement in the 1927–28 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology,” in which Heidegger rules out the possibility of
Christian philosophy. Yet Heidegger also maintains that this negative pronouncement has ultimately positive implications for both Christian faith
and theology, since it frees theology to focus on its proper task.
Heidegger suggests that formal indication can act as a methodological
mediator between philosophy and theology, since it pertains to ontological
structures, while preserving the integrity of particular ontic (i.e., theological) realizations of these structures. Some theologians, such as Heidegger’s
colleague Rudolf Bultmann, accept this delineation of disciplinary borders. But Dietrich Bonhoeﬀer challenges Heidegger on this point, since
it proceeds with an ontological assumption that is highly problematic:
namely, that autonomous human being (Dasein) can place itself into the
truth about its own being. Bonhoeﬀer contends that Dasein cannot place
itself into the truth about Being in general, because theology’s claims,
which derive from revelation, are not only ontic—they are also ontological, rendering Heidegger’s fundamental ontology subject to revision. In
this regard, Bonhoeﬀer’s critique makes an important contribution to the
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ongoing discussion of Heidegger’s account of the relationship between
philosophy and theology.
I. Heidegger on Philosophy, Faith, and Theology
Heidegger opens his lecture “Phenomenology and Theology” by considering a common conception of the relationship between philosophy and
theology, according to which knowledge and faith, reason and revelation,
stand opposed. Heidegger proposes to proceed otherwise. In his view
this relationship concerns the interaction between two sciences, each with
distinct possibilities and guiding ideas. Heidegger bases his distinction
on the ontological diﬀerence—the diﬀerence between the ontic and the
ontological, i.e., between particular beings and the being of those beings.
Corresponding to this diﬀerence are two types of sciences, with their own
modes of discourse aiming at their own types of disclosure: On the one
hand are ontic sciences, which concern a particular being or region of beings; on the other hand, ontology is the science of being qua being. Thus
positive, ontic sciences seek to disclose beings, while ontology inquires
into the being of those beings. For Heidegger, the ontological science is
philosophy, which diﬀers absolutely rather than relatively from all positive
sciences—including theology.1
In what sense is theology a positive science? Heidegger outlines three
defining features of positive sciences: First, every positive science inquires
into a region of being that is already disclosed in a preliminary fashion,
such that this region suggests a possible thematization. Second, this ontic
region is given in a pre-theoretical manner. Scientific thematization does
not encompass this pre-theoretical disclosure of beings, although the latter
may remain implicit and unthematized within positive science. Third, this
pre-scientific comportment to a region of beings is “already illuminated
and guided by an understanding of being—even if it be nonconceptual.”2
As we know from Being and Time, this assumption is central to Heidegger’s
project of fundamental ontology. Dasein always already has a preliminary
understanding of Being, which philosophy (as the ontological science) investigates. This assumption will also prove vital to Heidegger’s conception
of the relationship between philosophy and theology.
Granting this definition of positive science, what region of beings does
theology thematize? According to Heidegger theology’s theme is “Christianness,” which refers to the experience of faith in everyday existence.
This “way of existence . . . arises not from Dasein or spontaneously through
Dasein,” but rather through the revelation of Christ, the crucified God.
The “existence struck by this revelation is revealed to itself in its forgetfulness of God,” and in “being placed before God . . . existence is reoriented
in and through the mercy of God grasped in faith.”3 Faithful existence is
therefore the object of theology. Theology is not a science that produces
speculative knowledge of God; it is not the science of “the all-inclusive
relationship of God to man and of man to God”; it is not a psychology of
religion.4 Instead, theology is “the science of the action of God on human
beings who act in faith.”5
It is important that we understand Heidegger’s distinction between
faith and theology here, because while “faith does not need philosophy,
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the science of faith as a positive science does.”6 Heidegger insists that faith
does not need the insights of philosophy, going so far as to claim that
faithful existence and philosophy are absolutely mortal enemies.7 Philosophy cannot gain an upper hand over faith, because faith does not seek
legitimacy in philosophy or any other ‘faithless science.’ These sciences
‘shatter’ when they run up against faith—provided, of course, that one
assumes the perspective of faith. Therein lies the diﬃculty of mediating
the rival claims of faith and philosophy: Faithful existence is impervious
to external threats, but this imperviousness is no proof for those outside
of faith.8
Despite this lack of independent philosophical legitimacy, however,
Heidegger still desires to preserve the integrity of faith. Why? Is it because of Heidegger’s reverence for religious faith? There is no denying
that Heidegger holds a certain form of religiousness in high regard, but
this reverence is not necessarily the motive for his claim that faith does not
need philosophy. First and foremost, his motive is methodological. Faith
is one manner of existence among others, and in the everydayness of lived
experience it does not need philosophy. We might say the same regarding
an athlete: Philosophy can inquire into athletic existence, but the athlete
does not need philosophy to exist athletically. In short, ‘faith’ is neither an
ontic nor an ontological science.
When we seek to articulate faith in creeds, statements, and doctrines,
however, we enter the realm of theology as a positive science. And
while “theology itself is founded primarily by faith,” the fact remains that
as a positive science “its statements and procedures of proof formally
derive from free operations of reason.”9 Consequently, while faith does
not need philosophy, theology certainly does. This is not because theology should use philosophy to build itself up via speculative reason.
Much to the contrary, this is precisely what Heidegger wants theology to
avoid. Instead Heidegger envisions philosophy guiding theology away
from speculation and back to its own proper region of inquiry. When it
is faithful to its proper task, theology does not seek its content in philosophy, but instead permits “its concepts and conceptual schemes to be
determined by the mode of being and the specific substantive content of
that entity which it objectifies.” In other words, theology must be faithful
to lived religious experience instead of burdening itself with a philosophical programme.10
If theology needs philosophy, then, it is “only in regard to its scientific character, and even then only in a uniquely restricted, though basic
way.”11 How? Recall Heidegger’s earlier claim that a science’s pre-thematic
comportment to the given ontic region is “already illuminated and guided
by an understanding of being.”12 This means that any region of being—
anything that is, “discloses itself only on the grounds of a preliminary . . . ,
preconceptual understanding of what and how such a being is. Every ontic interpretation operates on the basis, at first and for the most part concealed, of an ontology.”13 Since philosophy is the only ontological science, it
has the unique responsibility of providing a corrective to the positive ontic
sciences and their basic concepts.14 Philosophy must correct theology by
formally indicating its proper region. In “Phenomenology and Theology,” as
with many of his texts through the 1920s, Heidegger employs the notion
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of formal indication without explaining what it entails. In order to make
sense of this suggestion, then, we must consider what Heidegger means by
‘formal indication.’
II. On Formal Indication
We find Heidegger’s most explicit and extended discussion of formal indication in his WS 1920–21 lecture course, “Introduction to the Phenomenology
of Religion.”15 Heidegger opens the course with methodological reflections
on the importance of attending to the phenomena of religious existence as
they are concretely given.16 The problem, as Heidegger outlines it, is to find
a type of language that does not objectify lived experience. Philosophical
discourse tends to take the particular, the historical and the personal and
render them in static, calculable concepts.17 Such is the allure of the theoretical. But our primordial engagement with the world is not theoretical,
so when we assume a theoretical posture through philosophy or science,
we generate concepts while losing touch with the phenomena as they are
given in concrete lived experience. No doubt a degree of disengagement
is necessary for philosophical reflection, just as we need concepts in order
to proceed philosophically. But Heidegger’s concern is to find a mode of
philosophical thinking and writing that remains faithful to the singularity
of concrete lived experience.
a.) In What Sense Formal?
Heidegger presents formal indication as the proper method of phenomenological inquiry, since it is grounded in concrete existence and ultimately
points back to enactment in the same concrete existence. But he is careful to distinguish his notion of ‘formal’ from the generality of Husserl’s
formalization, which prejudices phenomenological inquiry toward the
theoretical.18 Heidegger substantiates this claim in his reconfiguration of
Husserl’s distinction between empty intentions and fulfilling intuitions.19
Husserl writes of two distinct acts that constitute meaning: An act that
intends a meaningful object, and the intuitive act that fulfills that intention.
For example, if my wife says “The picture on the wall is hanging askew,” I
have a meaning-intention, which remains empty until I look at the wall and
perceive that the picture is indeed hanging askew—thereby achieving an
intuitive fulfillment (in this case sensible) of my intention, with the intending and intuitive acts forming a unity.
Heidegger takes Husserl’s distinction and alters it, distinguishing between three moments or “directions” of meaning. These three moments
are not merely co-existing, separable parts of a phenomenon; rather, a phenomenon “is the totality of sense in these three directions.” One can therefore consider a phenomenon in one of three ways: One can inquire into the
original “what” of the experience, i.e., the content-sense (Gehaltssinn). One
can also inquire into the original “how” of the experience, i.e., the relational-sense (Bezugssinn). Merold Westphal observes that this distinction between Gehalt and Bezug resembles (without replicating) Husserl’s distinction, with the content-sense (Gehalt) approximating the intended meaning
(the picture hanging askew) and the relational-sense (Bezug) approximating the mode of this intention (in this case, visual perception).20 But what
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should we make of the third moment of the phenomenon, which Heidegger calls the enactment-sense (Vollzugssinn)? According to Heidegger
this second “how” concerns the concrete realization in which one accomplishes, brings about, or enacts the relational meaning (the first how).21 As
Westphal suggests, the diﬀerence between the relational how (Bezugssinn)
and the enacted how (Vollzugssinn) recalls Husserl’s distinction between
empty intentions and fulfilling intuitions. 22 But for Husserl, fulfillment
is a cognitive event, involving some mode of observation, recognition,
remembrance, understanding, etc. By presuming that all phenomena are
available to this sort of apprehension, Husserl prejudices phenomenology
toward the theoretical and its objectifying use of concepts. Heidegger, on
the other hand, is attuned to the elusiveness of phenomena—especially
the type one encounters in the phenomenology of religious existence.
Thus the enactment-sense is not simply a cognitive apprehension; rather,
it requires an active response in one’s concrete historical situation. The
enactment-sense is a matter of action, such that it is not simply known—it
must be done.23
Heidegger argues that Husserl’s formal categories succumb to the prejudices of the theoretical because they leave the content-sense (Gehaltssinn)
undetermined. This is precisely how the formal diﬀers from the general;
namely, general categories are inseparable from their content. 24 For instance, ‘colour’ is present or inherent in ‘red,’ just as ‘red’ is inherent within
particular instances of redness. By contrast, purely formal categories like
‘object’ or ‘property’ lack all determinate content, and do not pertain to
particular species. But here Heidegger poses a question: If formal categories do not derive from their content, on what basis do we develop purely
formal categories? Heidegger claims that formalization is not motivated
by the content of the object, but by the relation to the object. As he writes,
“I must see away from the what-content [Wasgehalt] and attend only to the
fact that the object is a given, attitudinally grasped one.” In other words,
formalization is not a matter of what, but how. Heidegger’s objection, then,
is that the how of Husserlian formalization is fundamentally theoretical.
But why does formalization fall prey to the theoretical? Since these
formal-ontological categories leave the content-sense undetermined, one
might expect that it remains free of all prejudices. After all, formalization
can pertain to any content whatsoever. But Heidegger argues that it is
precisely this indeterminacy of content that is to blame. When a philosopher approaches a phenomenon formally, the relation-sense (Bezugssinn)
and the enactment-sense (Vollzugssinn) get skewed. Although it leaves the
content-sense undetermined, the formal-ontological approach prescribes
the nature of the relation-sense; that is, it prescribes “a theoretical relational meaning,” while hiding “the enactment-character [das Vollzugmäβige]”
and turning “one-sidedly to the content.”25 In other words, it gives priority to the objective concepts of the theoretical how, and proceeds to generate formal categories while ignoring the centrality of the enacted how in
the phenomenon.
In Heidegger’s view the prioritizing of the theoretical, objective, and formal is the majority voice throughout the history of philosophy. When faced
with concrete, factical life philosophers have the tendency to take refuge in
objectivity, which promises reliable and calculable insights regarding the
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world. The task of formal indication is to “retrieve the phenomena” from
this theoretical objectivity. Like Husserl’s formal-ontological categories,
Heidegger’s formal indication still attends to the relational how (Bezugssinn)
of the phenomenon, but it gives no preliminary determination to the relation. Instead, “its relational meaning is held in abeyance,”26 which is crucial
to preserving the freedom of the enactment-sense against the propensity to
fall into the theoretical posture.27 But unlike Husserl’s formal-ontological
categories, formal indication preserves the openness of the enactment how
(Vollzugssinn). This does not deny the need for the theoretical attitude altogether, but it does deny its primacy—especially in regions like religious life,
where phenomena are not typically available to such an attitude. In sum, if
we lack a proper appreciation for the enactment-sense of such phenomena,
we cannot understand their meanings as they are given in the concreteness
of historical existence. In order to clarify this notion of the ‘enactment-sense,’
however, we must consider what Heidegger means by ‘indication.’
b.) In What Sense ‘Indicative’?
Heidegger’s emphasis on enactment allows formal indication to avoid
the objectifying tendencies of philosophical concepts, because it does
not seek to capture or contain the enactment-sense; rather, it indicates the
enactment-sense. Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s term “indication”
(Anzeige) from Husserl’s discussion of “essentially occasional expressions”
in Chapter 3 of Logical Investigation I.28 At that point in the text Husserl has
established his theory of meaning as an ideal entity, pure and distinct from
the act that bestows meaning. The ideality of meaning appears tenable
in some areas of inquiry and discourse (e.g., “an adequately expounded
scientific theory”), where “objective expressions” present meanings that
are the same in every context.29 But what about expressions like “I am
here,” or, “It is raining today”? By their very nature the meaning of these
expressions depends on who speaks them, and at what time and place
this speaking occurs.30 (In this regard Husserl’s treatment of essentially
occasional expressions resembles Reichenbach’s later analysis of tokenreflexive expressions, whose truth-value depends on the circumstances of
their utterance).
Husserl examines the word ‘I’: Its meaning can be ascertained “only
from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it.” Personal pronouns like ‘I’ or ‘we’ serve as universal semantic
functions that indicate particular people in particular contexts. But this
semantic function does not immediately constitute the meaning of ‘I’
in this context. Instead, every use of the word ‘I’ is accompanied by an
“I-presentation”, because the self-referentiality of the word ‘I’ involves
a distinct self-awareness. The speaker’s use of the word is realized in
the idea of his or her own personality. This “I-presentation” is unique to
each person, but it allows us to understand another person’s use of the
word ‘I’. When another speaker uses the word, it indicates the speaker’s
‘I-presentation,’ enabling the hearer to intuit the self-referentiality of the
speaker. With the word ‘I,’ “an indicative function mediates, crying as it
were, to the hearer ‘Your vis-à-vis intends himself.’” 31 The meaning of ‘I’
depends on which person says it, but its indicative function allows both
parties to understand either possible meaning.
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Husserl argues that in occasional expressions there are in fact two meanings “built upon one another”—the indicating meaning and the indicated
meaning. The indicating meaning is the expression’s general semantic
function; ‘I’ indicates the specific ‘I-presentation’, which is only properly
meaningful if the indicated meaning (a particular person) is present (in a
particular context). The indicative function is “exercised for the other, singular presentation, and, by subsumption, makes the latter’s object known
as what is here and now meant.”32 In this regard the relation between indicating and indicated meanings is structurally similar to the relation between
empty intentions and fulfilling intuitions,33 since the indication is characterized by an “empty intelligibility” that must be “filled.”34
Heidegger’s notion of formal indication derives from this model of essentially occasional expressions. But whereas for Husserl the fulfillment
of an indication comes in the intuition of an ideal meaning, for Heidegger
an indication points to the how35 of enactment. The phenomena in question
involve meaningful actions rather than ideas alone. “An indicative definition includes the sense that concretion is not to be possessed there without
further ado but that the concrete instead presents a task of its own kind
and a peculiarly constituted task of actualization.”36 Formal indications
do not indicate meanings to which we can merely give intellectual assent.
Rather, they indicate possibilities for concrete transformation, pointing to
ways of being in the world. But Dasein must actualize this transformation.
Formal indications “can only ever address the challenge of such a transformation to us, but can never bring about this transformation themselves.”37
And it is in actualizing this transformation that Dasein enacts the meaning
of a phenomenon. Formal indication is therefore not objectifying, because
it directs us away from objective concepts, back to the transformation of
our own concrete historical existence.
Despite Heidegger’s emphasis on enactment, however, formal indication
does not prescribe a particular truth or worldview.38 If formal indication
takes on a particular interpretation of existence, it prejudices one’s phenomenological interpretations of existence. Yet while formal indication is not
prescriptive, it is indicative, directing one’s attention to the appropriate region of being. This is how philosophy serves theology. By formally indicating theology’s proper region of inquiry, philosophy acts as a corrective. But
philosophy does not direct theology; it co-directs theology by pointing it
back to its proper areas of inquiry, while not dictating theology’s ventures.39
Philosophy does not demand that theology acknowledge this corrective;
in fact, it cannot establish this role for itself vis à vis theology. This relation
remains the prerogative of theology. Consequently, Heidegger’s model
might sound like good news for theology. Whether theology should accept
this model is another question.
III. Bonhoeﬀer’s Theological Response
We have examined the relationship between philosophy and theology
from Heidegger’s philosophical perspective. We will now examine the
transaction from theology’s perspective. But the theological response
to Heidegger’s model has varied so widely that on this matter we cannot speak of theology as a united front, so we will focus specifically on
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Dietrich Bonhoeﬀer’s response. The convictions motivating Bonhoeﬀer’s
critique appear throughout his authorship, but the explicit critique of
Heidegger appears most prominently in Bonhoeﬀer’s Act and Being,40 and
his inaugural lecture entitled “Man [sic] in Contemporary Philosophy
and Psychology.”41
Bonhoeﬀer’s criticisms start with the human being’s attempt to understand “himself from his possibilities in reflection on himself . . . .”42 But
philosophy cannot proceed otherwise; apart from revelation, it has no
other resources on which to draw. “Per se, a philosophy can concede no
room for revelation unless it knows revelation and confesses itself to be
Christian philosophy in full recognition that the place it wanted to usurp
is already occupied by another—namely, by Christ.”43 Heidegger excludes
this possibility completely, along with any notion of ‘Christian philosophy’. By its very essence philosophy cannot make room for revelation. If
it did, it would no longer be philosophy, since “there is no such thing as
a Christian philosophy; that is an absolute ‘square circle.’”44 This is not to
say that Christians cannot do phenomenology, philosophy, or ontology,
but it does entail that they must do so a-theistically. Qua philosopher, the
Christian does not know revelation.
Philosophy understands its a-theism as responsible methodology, but
theology understands it as symptomatic of the cor curvum in se—the heart
turned in on itself. Autonomous philosophical thought remains imprisoned
within itself, which “is the true expression of man questioning himself in
statu corruptionis.”45 Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein is no different, because it begins and ends with Dasein. Of course, for Heidegger
the analysis of Dasein is subordinate to the larger question of Being qua
Being. Bonhoeﬀer recognizes that Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is
ontological46 and not a melodramatic philosophical anthropology, as many
mistakenly thought at the time.47 But here is the problem: since Heidegger
bases his fundamental ontology on the existential analytic of Dasein, everything depends on getting Dasein right. Yet if Bonhoeﬀer is correct, this is
not possible in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, because autonomous selfunderstanding does not belong to Dasein’s possibilities.
Throughout his corpus Bonhoeﬀer oﬀers an ongoing critique of the
concept of possibility or potentiality as an immanent possession of the
human being. His critique does not pertain to possibility in the broad
sense—as, for instance, a trip to the cinema is a possibility for this evening. Nor does it deny potentiality in the broad sense, such as my young
cousin’s capacity to learn French. Rather, it concerns the human attempt
to know the truth about oneself, to know the diﬀerence between good
and evil, and to establish one’s status before God. These eﬀorts are a
fundamental consequence of sin. Prior to the Fall, humankind existed in
the image of God (Imago Dei), being for both God and the neighbor in
an “original creatureliness and limitedness.”48 In this state God was the
source of all human understanding, and in their relation to God human
beings did not exist in possibilities, but in the reality of obedience.49 After
the Fall, humankind became ‘like God’ (Sicut Deus)—“knowing out of its
own self about good and evil, in having no limit and acting out of its own
resources, in its aseity, in its being alone.”50 Bonhoeﬀer’s objection to the
concept of possibility therefore concerns the human eﬀort to understand
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oneself via reflection on one’s immanent possibilities, rather than “in the
act of reference to God.”51
But here another problem arises: According to Bonhoeﬀer, not only can
Dasein not understand itself autonomously, it cannot even recognize its
failure to do so. “It is never possible for a systematic metaphysics to know
that ‘one cannot give oneself truth,’ for such knowledge would already
signify a placing of oneself into truth.”52 One can only recognize this from
the perspective of revelation,53 and one cannot make room for revelation
and thereby anticipate truth,54 because thought “is as little able as good
works to deliver the cor curvum in se from itself.”55 This concept of sin is
definitive for understanding Dasein’s being: “ . . . it is not possibilities
which are his nature, but that his nature is determined by ‘Thou art under
sin’ or ‘Thou art under grace’.”56 The problem is that these ontological
determinations are only understandable through revelation.
Heidegger agrees with Bonhoeﬀer on this point, since he himself claims
that “sin is manifest only in faith, and only the believer can factically
exist as a sinner.”57 Like Bonhoeﬀer, Heidegger has read his Luther, whose
Lectures on Romans proclaim: “Sola fide credendum est nos esse peccatores”
(“By faith alone we know that we are sinners”).58 Only the believer can
understand herself in these categories. Nevertheless, Heidegger maintains
that ontology still has a role to play. In order to articulate sin theologically,
the conceptual content of sin requires recourse to the ontological concept
of guilt, which “is an original ontological determination of the existence
of Dasein.”59 Although the source of the Christian concept of sin “is given
only by faith,” the theological concept of sin is nevertheless “a concept of
existence,” and as such it entails “pre-Christian content.”60
Operative in this claim is Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic
and the ontological, which we noted earlier. Theology is an ontic science
that pursues existentiell questions, i.e., questions regarding Dasein’s own
concerns and possibilities as a particular existing entity. Philosophy, as
the ontological science, conducts an existential analytic regarding the
structures that constitute Dasein’s existence.61 Regardless of the particular existentiell features of an existing individual, these particularities are
constituted by fundamental existential structures. This is why Heidegger
claims that theology can better formulate and understand the ontic
notions of ‘sin’ if it understands the ontological structure of ‘guilt.’ But
note that Heidegger also rejects the suggestion that sin can “be deduced
rationally from the concept of guilt,” or that sin is “simply built up upon
the ontological concept of guilt.”62 Theology does not acquire its ontic
content from ontology, since only faith knows about sin. That provision
aside, the conceptual content of sin is nevertheless an ontic determination
of the ontological structure of guilt.
If philosophy is supposed to oﬀer guidance and correction to theology,
one might wonder how philosophy acquires its ontological concepts. All
philosophical concepts, Heidegger argues, are formally indicative,63 and
derive hermeneutically from phenomenological inquiry into lived experience. Thus they are not eidetic, universal forms.64 They are provisional in
nature, since they arise in the hermeneutical circle. We always enter this
circle with our preliminary understanding— our ‘forehavings’—of lived
experience, which are “not something arbitrary and according to whim,”65

194

Faith and Philosophy

but instead “receive their concrete, factical, categorical determinateness
from the respective direction of experience and of interpretation.” Formal
indications are not prescriptive, and they supply no content. They simply
point the way, and “give direction to the regard.”66 They express Dasein
“in advance and propel it forward: grasping Dasein and stirring it by way
of their pointing.”67 In moving through indication to enactment, the formal
indication remains open to revision, thus advancing in a hermeneutical
spiral, “modifying itself in a factical manner from out of the situation with
respect to, on the basis of, and with a view to which hermeneutical questioning is operating in the particular case.”68 Consequently, the relationship
between philosophy and theology can be mutually beneficial: Ontology
will be enriched by inquiring into the ontic experience of faithful Christian
existence,69 while theology will acquire ontological insights regarding the
being of Dasein.70
According to Heidegger the ontological structures of Dasein pertain to
all particular existentiell realities, including sin and faith. However radical
the Christian notion of “rebirth” might be, the fact remains that “Dasein’s
prefaithful, i.e., unbelieving existence is sublated [aufgehoben] therein.” The
ontological structures of Dasein are not destroyed by the rebirth of faith, but
instead are “raised up, kept, and preserved in the new creation.” In other
words, “pre-Christian Dasein is existentially, ontologically included within
faithful existence.”71 One might be radically new on an existentiell level, but
this does not alter the existential structures of one’s being qua Dasein. This
is why philosophy can continue to play the role of co-director in relation
to theology. Theological concepts continue to be determined ontologically
“by a content that is pre-Christian and that can thus be grasped purely
rationally. All theological concepts necessarily contain that understanding
of being that is constitutive of human Dasein as such, insofar as it exists at
all.”72 As an existing human being, then, the Christian’s being is still ontologically constituted by the structures of Dasein. 73
This fundamental ontological constitution also enables philosophy’s
autonomous phenomenological inquiry into the human being. As Rudolf
Bultmann proposes in his 1930 essay “The Historicity of Man and Faith,”
philosophy and theology both question the human; the diﬀerence is that
philosophy concerns “the natural man” whereas theology concerns “the man
of faith.” “Natural” in this sense “is a purely formal ontological designation,” with no regard to questions of faith or unfaith; philosophical analysis only “exhibits the condition of the possibility that a man can comport
himself faithfully or unfaithfully.”74 Bultmann, whose theology is earnestly
faithful to Heidegger’s model, vehemently opposes the suggestion that
faithful existence might be “exempt from the ontological conditions of human existence.”75 After asking whether theology might correct or amend
the ontological analysis of Dasein, in order to supplant it with a competing
ontology, Bultmann’s answer is an exclamatory “No!”76
Yet this is what Bonhoeﬀer proposes in his critique of Heidegger and
Bultmann. In response to Bultmann’s claim that “‘believing Dasein is still
Dasein in every instance,’”77 Bonhoeﬀer argues that revelation challenges
any autonomous ontology of Dasein and its possibilities. In his words, “if
revelation is essentially an event of God’s free activity, then it supercedes
and challenges also the existential-ontological possibilities of Dasein.” The
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event of revelation reveals that “Dasein is no longer essentially identical
with itself on account of itself,” and this event claims the exclusive right “to
be the initiator of the unity of Dasein.” In the contingent event of revelation,
“the deepest root of philosophy, the one from which it derives its claims, it
cut.”78 Dasein can no longer claim to understand itself through itself.
Heidegger and Bultmann will no doubt chafe at this suggestion, which
seems to ignore their eﬀorts to distinguish between existential structures
and existentiell determinations. But Bonhoeﬀer does in fact recognize this
distinction. What he rejects is the insistence that revelation must respect
the ontological diﬀerence: “The letting go of the ontic by retreat into the
ontological [unity of Dasein] is considered futile by revelation.” Revelation goes all the way down. Granted, it is an existentiell event, but in this
event “the existential structure of Dasein is touched and changed. There
is no second mediator, not even the existential structure of Dasein.” The
ontological does not lie beyond the reach of revelation. “For revelation,
the ontic-existentiell and ontological-existential structures coincide.”79
Pre-Christian existence does not diﬀer from faithful existence solely on an
ontic level. It also diﬀers ontologically.
This coincides with Bonhoeﬀer’s rejection of a neutral ontology based on
the concept of ‘creation.’ In the state of sin, philosophical reflection cannot
know what original creaturely being is. Nor can theology base ontological
categories on the idea of creation without considering the fact that human
being is either “being in ‘Adam’” or “being in Christ.” From the perspective
of revelation, the realities of sin and grace determine Dasein’s being.80 Bonhoeﬀer rejects the “attempt to utilize the idea of creature in a fundamentally
ontological fashion,”81 arguing that “(t)he ‘there’ [‘Da’] of human beings is
not to be defined independently of the ‘how’ [‘Wie’].” Creaturely Da-sein
cannot be understood apart from ‘how’ it is, for it “only ‘is’ in Adam or
in Christ, in unfaith or in faith, in Adamic humanity and in Christ’s community.” Given the reality of sin, the “concrete being-how-it-is [Wie-sein]”
violates the created form of Da-sein and renders such distinctions as ontic/ontological, existentiell/existential, and there/how meaningless.82 For this
reason, “the idea of creation is unable to provide a basis for the ontological
definition of the human being in Christ.”83 There is no neutral ontology that
can serve both being in Adam and being in Christ.
One might respond, as Bultmann does, by acknowledging that revelation does not leave “profane existence” untouched—that revelation gives it
“a definitive ‘clarification’” that philosophy does not perceive.84 But is this
notion of ‘clarification’ suﬃcient? In Bonhoeﬀer’s view faith is not merely
a modification of ontic realities, but the deeper modification of ontological
structures themselves. Dasein in Adam becomes Dasein in Christ. Of course,
this is hardly satisfying in an autonomous analysis of Dasein, which will
object to any “pseudo-theological attempt” that seeks to “interpret Christianity as an ‘existential’ of human existence.”85 Theology, Bultmann insists,
should not presume to be ontology. Bultmann adds that philosophy will
not object to the ontological possibility of faith, since it is already its responsibility to articulate the conditions of this possibility in Dasein.
With this claim we broach another decisive diﬀerence between Heidegger/Bultmann and Bonhoeﬀer. What we find are two diﬀerent understandings of faith: According to the former view, faith is a possibility that
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belongs to Dasein. It “is not a new quality that inheres in the believer, but
rather a possibility of man that must constantly be laid ahold of anew
because man only exists by constantly laying hold of his possibilities.”86
Bonhoeﬀer, by contrast, argues that faith does not belong to Dasein as a
possibility or ability, whether ontic or ontological. Karl Barth’s influence
on Bonhoeﬀer is clear at this point, with the latter contending that “faith
is not even an impossibility but a contingent happening of revelation in
reality.”87 The same holds for sin, which “also is no human possibility, not
even of fallen humanity, nor is it an absolute possibility; it is an occurring
reality.”88 In and of itself, Dasein does not possess the possibility of faith.
Hence Bonhoeﬀer’s objection that Heidegger’s ontology is one of “closedin finitude”: It does not leave room for revelation as a contingent event,
independent of Dasein’s possibilities. Yet this is what the faithful reception
of revelation entails. “‘In faith’ people understand themselves as in the
church of Christ in their new being, in an existential reality that was not
included in their deepest potentiality.”89 For this reason, the ontological
structures of Dasein are subject to radical revision in light of revelation.
What might this revised ontology—the being of this new being—look
like? Ontologically, ‘Being in Adam’ is marked by the fundamental solitude of the heart turned in on itself, estrangement from God and one’s
neighbor, and internal division. Dasein’s present state is death—i.e., death
as being unable to live, yet being forced to live from one’s own resources.90
This claim contrasts sharply with Heidegger, for whom death is Dasein’s
“ownmost potentiality-for-being”—a possibility that wrenches Dasein from
the anonymous mass of the ‘they’ (Das Man) and provides the occasion for
authentic being-towards-death. Such a relation to death is fundamentally
non-relational—i.e., it separates and individualizes Dasein, because no
one else can take Dasein’s place in death.91 But according to Bonhoeﬀer,
this model of authentic existence only perpetuates the solitude of Dasein
in statu corruptionis. Dasein finds itself not by reflecting on its own possibilities, but in the reorienting relation to Christ.92
Through the crucified and risen one a new possibility breaks into
Dasein’s closed world—the possibility of the future, which is for Dasein
an impossibility. In Christ the human being is defined by “something
outside,” something “‘yet to come.’” The human being is now defined by
an eschatological possibility—by a future that enables one to live in the
present. This is not the Heideggerian future of one’s own death, because
that future belongs to Dasein’s own possibilities. Heidegger’s future is
not a genuine future. “There is a genuine future only through Christ
and the reality, created anew by Christ, of the neighbor and creation.
Estranged from Christ, the world is enclosed in the I, which is to say,
already in the past.”93 In being defined by our present possibilities, we
succumb to the past—viz., sin and death.94
An ontology of ‘Being in Christ’, then, must consider the way Christ
overcomes the solitude of fallen Dasein, restoring relations and establishing
Dasein’s being for God and the neighbor. This ontology will also be ecclesial in nature, because the church witnesses to this futurity: “The church of
Christ witnesses to the end of all things. It lives from the end, it thinks from
the end, it acts from the end, it proclaims its message from the end.”95 The
church—like the believer—does not proclaim its own resources. It never
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grasps revelation as an immanent possession, but rather witnesses to the
good news of the resurrection.96
Where does all of this leave philosophical ontology? Does it play any
role in theological inquiry? Can theology successfully ignore philosophy?
There are significant problems with making indiﬀerence one’s strategy;
when theology presumes to ignore philosophy, it usually remains dependent on philosophical insights—but unwittingly and thus uncritically.97
Bonhoeﬀer recognizes this danger, and always maintains that theology
cannot simply jettison philosophy.98 Theological inquiry must begin with “a
certain formal ‘preunderstanding’, on the basis of which alone questions—
even if the wrong ones—can be raised, whose answer is then surrendered
by revelation, together with a fundamental correction of the question.”99 In
other words, theology takes place within the hermeneutical circle.
But if theology requires these preliminary forms of thought, should
Bonhoeﬀer not recognize Heidegger’s formal indication as a valuable tool?
What, in the end, is the diﬀerence between Bonhoeﬀer and Heidegger on
this point? In summary, we can point to the following: First, we noted
Bonhoeﬀer’s critique of Heidegger’s autonomous philosophical analysis
of Dasein. Dasein presumes to be capable of placing itself into the truth
regarding its own being.100 Even if Heidegger gives a nod to theology by
acknowledging that one cannot do this on an existentiell level, Bonhoeﬀer
locates this failure at the ontological level. Second, Bonhoeﬀer rejects the
view that faith belongs to the ontological possibilities of Dasein, since
this obscures the status of revelation as a contingent event. Thus formal
indication cannot point the human being in the right direction, because
it cannot anticipate faith as a human possibility. Heidegger shows great
insight by identifying the importance of the enactment-sense in lived
experience—something that is especially important regarding religious
phenomena. But for Bonhoeﬀer, faith is not a possibility one can enact—least of all through the direction of autonomous philosophy. Third,
Bonhoeﬀer rejects the claim of a neutral ontology of Dasein that remains
constant through the experience of this revelation, in the transition from
unfaith to faith. Ontologically, the human person is either Being in Adam,
or Being in Christ. For this reason Bonhoeﬀer concludes that Heidegger’s
ontology, “despite its enormous expansion through the discovery of the
existential sphere, remains unsuitable for theology.”101 Since Heidegger’s
method of formal indication assumes his ontology, for theology the good
news of formal indication turns out to be a false hope.102
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